New Zealand immigration law and family reunification by Goodlet, Debbie M.
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
G652 
1994 
DEBBIE M GOODI,ET 
NEW ZEAIJAND IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
:FA:\1IL\' IAW(LAWS 513) 
I,,.. '"r F Cl'LT\ 
VICTORIA e. rIVERSITY OF \\'ELLINGTON 
1994 
y 
3 . 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 
I INTRODUCTION 
II BEING IN NEW ZEALAND LAWFULLY 
A New Zealand Citizenship 
B Obtaining Permanent Residency 
C What Having New Zealand Citizenship .Means 
D vVhat Having a Permanent Residency Permit Means 
III HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF AN IMMIGRANTS 
STATUS 
IV 
V 
A 
B 
Colonial New Zealand's Immigration Law 
Immigration Act 1964 
THE IMMIGRATION ACT 1987 
A 
B 
C 
Grant of a Residence Permit 
Removal Warrants 
Summary 
GOVERNMENT RESIDENCE POLICY 
A 
B 
The Fam i ~v Cate gory 
Genuine Relationship 
1 
-, 
N(J),11 Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Human Rights Act 1993 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
9 
10 
10 
11 
14 
15 
17 
18 
19 
21 
21 
25 
28 
2 
VI 
C Family Reunion 
1 The humanitarian category 
Adoption cases and family reunion 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A 
B 
Illegality 
Irrationality 
VII HOW JUDICIAL REVIEW IS APPLIED IN 
IM:MJGRA TION CASES 
A 
B 
Ashby vAfinister of Immigration 
Tavita v Minister of Immigration 
VIIl CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
29 
30 
31 
34 
35 
37 
40 
40 
42 
47 
50 
3 
4 
ABSTRACT 
This research paper began by focussing on New Zealand's immigration legislation 
and policy and how they affected the family. As the paper developed it became 
apparent that this topic was not confined to an analysis of statute and 
governmental manuals. The topic of immigration law is entwined with the topic of 
administrative law and in particular judicial review. This factor often introduces 
such fundamental legal concepts as the rule of law and the separation of powers. 
hnmigration law through its close relationship to judicial review is therefore 
constantly developing. 
Common law developments in this topic have brought the question of the effect 
of international law on municipal law into the domain of immigration and the 
family issues. The enactment of legislation in New Zealand for the protection of 
fundamental human rights also impacts on the right1; of migrants and New 
Zealand families to be together and must be examined. 
This topic covers many facets of the law, most of which are less than certain and 
in a constant state of flux. This paper is an attempt to introduce the area and some 
of the questions it raises. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes. bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 13.200 words . 
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I INTRODUCTION 
"In an ideal world there would be no restrictions on immigration. 1n the 
actual world accidents of history_ geography and climate create pressures to 
emigrate which are not matched by facilities for reception. Hence the 
imposition of immigration controls designed to produce a logical and just 
system for admitting those numbers and categories oflong-terrn and short-
tenn applicants for entry who can be absorbed without disastrous 
economic, administrative or social consequences ." (R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, exp Khawaja [1983) 2 WLR 321 , 357-358, per 
Lord Templeman). 
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State regulation of movement across national borders is an almost universal 
activity. The definition of those who are subject to this controi the purposes 
behind the regulation, and the process by which the law is regulated show wide 
variations between countries. But one startling similarity of all nations 
immigration policies is the effect upon the lives of those against whom the power 
is exercised. The wide reaching effects of the powers conferred through 
immigration law impacts most on the basic social unit of the family. 
Few governmental powers may destroy family ties to the e:x.1ent of immigration 
policy and process. When one thinks of immigration it is not difficult to perceive 
the potential effects it can have on the family attempting to live together in one 
country. The effects of separation and alienation on immediate and extended 
families are severe. This paper is primarily about the law that embodies New 
Zealand immigration policy and the legal and administrative framework within 
which family reunification is administered. 
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The subject of immigration arouses much interest and comment, not only from 
persons whose lives are directly regulated by immigration law. The magnitude of 
influence which immigration issues carry, can be exhibited by looking at the 
diverse areas they affect. For example; the conflict between national and 
individual interests, the foreign affairs ramifications, the economic impact of 
immigrants, the environmental issues, and the social, cultural, raciai and 
philosophical questions raised by immigration control all coalesce to make this area 
a prime target for heated discussion. 
Recent dialogue in the New Zealand media has focused on a number of specific 
issues, including the treatment of illegal immigrants and the conferment of refugee 
status. But the debate has also generated larger questions that span race relations, 
and discrimination. Again the question of the impact on the families involved is 
often overlooked because of the multitude of complex social, economic and 
political questions which are raised in immigration cases. 
This paper will analyse the substantive criteria and procedural rules that govern the 
admission of immigrants into New Zealand based on family reunification. The 
growing importance of the courts role in the overall system of immigration control 
will be examined with particular regard to: judicial review issues, the applicability 
of international instruments and recent national human rights legislation. 
II BEING IN NEW ZEALAND LAWFULLY 
There are two ways to be in New Zealand legally. Firstly by being a citizen of 
New Zealand, under the Citizenship Act 1977. Or by being entitled in terms of 
the Immigration Act 1987 to reside in New Zealand. It is relevant to examine in 
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more depth how to obtain the above status and what having citizenship or 
residency means. It is an important role facing any modern State to define who 
its citizens or pe1manent residents are. Those persons in other words who have 
the status of members of the community and through such membership important 
rights and obligations flow. The way in which a State defines those who belong 
to it may reveal something of the nature of the society. 
Perhaps the most striking modern example is the State of Israel. Nationality law 
in Israel confers citizenship upon every immigrant to Israel under the law of the 
right of return. Every Jew ic;; entitled to immigrate under this law. This establishes 
Israel as a Jewish state. However, the extent to which the definition of a Jew 
should be determined in accordance with religious law or by some wider tesl 
perhaps that of lineage, has been a matter of acute controversy. This in tum 
reflects the disputed ideological foundation of the State. 1 
A New Zealand Citizenship 
The two most widely used basis for citizenship are birth in a state and descent 
from a citizen. Often a State will define its citizens through a combination of 
these two methods. Under section 6 of the New Zealand Citizenship Act 1977 
any person born in New Zealand2 obtains New Zealand citizenship. 3 Acquisition 
of citizenship can also be obtained through descent. 4 If a person is born outside 
1 J M Evans Immigration Law (2 e4 Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1983 l 90. 
2Section 2 Citizenship Act 1977, states that "New Zealand " includes the Cook Islands, Nme, 
Tokelau, and the Ross Dependency. 
3Unless their father or mother was in receipt of immunity from j urisdiction due to diplomatic or 
consular 1mmunity and neither parent was a New Zealand c11lZen. Sees 6(2)( a l Citizenship Act 
1977. 
4Section 7 Citizenship Act 1977. 
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New Zealand whose mother or father~ was born in New Zealand, they may 
acquire citizenship as of right of descent. 6 This is the only statutory right to reside 
in New Zealand based on a fami.lJ relationship. 
The most common way to obtain citizenship is through a grant. 7 A prerequisite of 
a grant is that the applicant is entitled pursuant to the Immigration Act 1987 to 
reside in New Zealand indefinitely. 8 This entitlement means that the person has 
been granted a residency permit under the Immigration Act 1987. 
B Obtaining Permanent Residency 
A permanent residents permit is granted pursuant to the Immigration Act 1987. 
There are no specific statutory criteria to obtain a residency permit, it is dependant 
on Minii;terial discretion . The relevant section states: "[T]he Minister may grant 
or refuse to grant a permit, as the Minister thinks fit. .. ''9 The Act does provide 
review and appeal right<; .10 Also developments in the judicial review of Ministerial 
decisions has fettered total discretion. 11 
Therefore the requirements for granting a residency permit on family reunification 
grounds are subject to many uncertain influences. For example Government 
residency policy, Ministerial discretion and judicial review. 
5Section 3 Citizenship Act 1977 relates to the presumption of parentage. A person is presumed to 
be the father of a child if he is married to the mother at the time of conception or birth. 
61ne right to citizenship because of descent IS rescinded two years after a person reaches the age 
of majority if they have not made an application for citizenship . Section 7 Citizenship Act 1977. 
7Section 8 Citizenship Act 1977. 
8Section 8(2) Citizenship Act 1977. 
9Section 35(1 ) lmrmgration Act 1987. 
1°For example ss 115-124 Immigration Act 1987. 
11 See section VI Judicial Review. 
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C What Having New Zealand Citizenship ,H eans 
A statement about the determination of citizenship by a State is incomplete 
without examination of the legal rights conferred by the virtue of citizenship. 
Citizenship rights for New Zealand citizens are protected by section 3 of the 
Immigration Act 1987. "Every New Zealand citizen has, by virtue of that 
citizenship, the right to be in New Zealand at any time." Section 3(3) proceeds to 
detail the rights of citizenship, without limiting the general premise stated above, 
no citizen is required to hold a permit to be in New Zealand. No pennit is 
required by a citizen to undertake employment, 12 a course of study or training in 
New Zealand. 13 No New Zealand citizen can be removed or deported from New 
Zealand in any circumstance. 14 
D ·what Having a Permanent Residency Permit Means 
A residency permit enables the bearer to stay in New Zealand indefmitely. 
Permanent residency entitles the holder to the same rights to work or train in New 
Zealand, as citizenship does. 15 The fundamental difference is that a residency 
pennit can be revoked whereas citizenship cannot be. Under sections 19 and 20 
of the Immigration Act 1987 a permit can be revoked in the case of an 
administrative error or if the permit was procured by :fraud.16 These are 
12'This includes employment within the exclusive economic zone. 
13"Study" includes primary through to high school state funded education. 
14..A. New Zealand citizen can renounce or be deprived of their cit:J.zenship under ssl5-16 
Citizenship Act 19,.,7 'This is in the instance where the citizen has acquired citizenship of another 
country. 
15Section 16 Immigration Ac1 1987. 
160ther grounds for revocation arc , where the permit was obtained through false or misleading 
information or concealment of relevant information, sees 20 Immigration Act 1987 
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exceptional circumstances, so practically a residence permit is very similar to 
having citizenship. Once a person has obtained a permanent residency permit the 
statutory criteria for obtaining citizenship are usually easily satisfied. 
ill HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF AN IM1v1IGRANTS STATUS 
A nations immigration policy and implementation are inevitably and distinctively 
influenced by its history, prevailing politica~ social and economic climate. By 
examining the historical origins of New Zealand's immigration stance the 
developments, strengths and weaknesses of the present system become obvious. 
A Colonial New Zealand's Immigration Law 
New Zealand received in 1840 the body of English law; common and statutory 
law including the law of nationality. New Zealand inherited the common law 
principles regarding the freedom of British subjects to move freely in and out of 
the Crown's dominions. 17 However the position of an immigrant regarding the 
freedom of entry was very different. One could only enter and remain within the 
realm by licence of the Crown. The issue of such licence was wholly within the 
Crown's prerogative.1& 
Early on in New Zealand's legal history statutes were passed restricting the entry of 
immigrants who were perceived as undesirable. 19 But the basic distinction for the 
purposes of controlling the entrance of immigrants was whether they were British 
17DPP v Bhagwan [ 1972) AC 60, 74, per Lord Dtplock. 
18Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch 149. 171 , per Lord Deruring MR. 
191ne Chinese Immigrants Act 1881 and the Imbecile Passengers Act 1882. 
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subjects or not. The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act was passed in 
1920 which introduced a permit system for entry into New Zealand. The essence 
of the Act was that unless a person was of British birth or parentage they were 
required to hold an entry permit. There was no other right of entrance by reason 
of family reunification. The :tvfinister was vested with the power to issue permits 
with total discretion, the common law would not interfere with this royal 
prerogative. 20 
The right of entry for people born in Britain or of British parentage lasted until 
1961 with the enactment of the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act. This 
stated that only New Zealand citizens were entitled to umestricted entry. This 
change indicated a further restriction of entry by establishing a more definite class 
of people who were automatically entitled to entry. 21 
B Immigration Act 1964 
To consolidate the law relating to immigration in 1964 the Immigration Act was 
passed. The Act provided a procedural framework to regulate immigration. Apart 
from a few exceptions, 22 the Executive of the day prescribed the criteria for 
immigrants who wished to enter New Zealand. A prospective immigrant who 
fulfilled the necessary policy criteria may have been granted a permit. Despite 
meeting the policy criteria the Mmister could refuse entry. The Mmister was 
20Above n 6. 
21 RA McGechan 'The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1961" (1964) 4 VUWLR 34. 
22Section 3 paras (c) to (i) listed those persons who were exempted from obtaining a permit, for 
example diplomatic officials. officers and crew of mercantile ships or aircraft. Section 4(2) 
provided immigrants who were prohibited immigrants. for example a mentally disorder person. a 
person who had been convicted of a crime and having served a sentence for a year or more and a 
person who had been deported fonn New Zealand 
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vested with very wide and general powers of discretion under the Act. There was 
no right to appeal a Minister's decision under the Act and the common law would 
not provide relief through judicial review. 23 The courts accepted the principle 
that an immigrant could not seek relief on the grounds that the Minister had failed 
to exercise the discretion fairly or in accordance with the principles of natural 
justice. 24 
The history of judicial review of immigration cases is one of restraint and an 
unwillingness of the Courts to intervene. The courts perceived that the powers 
conferred on the Minister under the Act were statutory embodiments of Crown 
prerogative and therefore it was not the Courts role to intervene. 25 As recently as 
1978 in the case of T obias26 the court held that there should be no fettering of the 
Crown's discretionary powers to issue or refuse permits under the Immigration Act 
1964. This confirmed, that in cases concerning the entry and removal of 
immigrants from New Zealand, the principles of natural justice or fairness could 
not be invoked where there may have been an abuse of the Ministers discretionary 
powers. 27 
Due to this judicial restraint, it seemed pointless to review :Ministerial decisions on 
immigration because the Minister had failed to exercise the discretionary powers 
fairly or in accordance with the rules of natural justice. The Minister's arbitrary 
23The 'right of appeal' refers to an appellate body assessing the correctness of the decision itself 
this is more than a review of the legal process. See Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1 
NZLR 116 andR v Sloan [1990) 1 NZLR 474 at 479. 
24 M Nyein Judicial Review of Immigration Law in Respect of Entry and Stay of Aliens 
(Research Paper in Administration Law, LLM, Victoria University of Wellington, 1986), 4 
25C Vincenzi "Aliens and the Judicial Review oflrnrnigration Law" (1985) Pub L 93 . 
26Tobias vMay [1978] 1 NZLR 509. 
27SeePagliara vAttorney General [1974) 1 NZLR 86, R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte 
Sob/en [ 1963] 2 QB 243, and R v Leman Street Police Station Inspector, ex parte Venicoff 
[1920] 3 KB 72. 
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decision could go unchallenged. But developments in the rights of immigrants 
though judicial review have established some procedural restraints on the 
Minister's previously unfettered discretion in the exercise of decision making 
powers. Statutory Amendments in the 1970's established the first statutory 
review and appeal regime. 
From the mid 1970's there was a substantial change in immigration policy, towards 
a more even handed approach. This corresponded with an increase in the volume 
and variety of immigrants entering the country. 28 The Immigration Amendment 
Act 1977 introduced an appeal on humanitarian grounds. 29 A 1978 Amendment 
Act created the Deportation Review Tribunal to safeguard the interest of 
deportees. Another statutory development was the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972 (as amended 1977) which streamlined the judicial policing of statutory 
powers of decision. and gave New Zealand courts a wide review powers. 
These statutory developments were parallelled with the common law reconsidering 
its stance that Crown prerogative in immigration cases need not comply with 
natural justice. In 1978 in the case of Chandra30 the court held that the Ministers' 
discretionary powers were statutory powers31 and therefore the general rules 
developed to review the exercise of such statutory powers were applicable. The 
court considered the legislative trend of the mid 1970's to represent a move away 
from the concept of Crown prerogative towards purely statutory based controls. 
This case was landmark in New Zealand immigration law as it established the 
court's right to review the Minister's discretionary powers it also stated that the 
28 Above n 24. 8. 
29Secuon 20A lmrmeration Amendment Act 1977. 
3°Chandra vMinist;r of Immigration [1978] 2 NZLR 559. 
31 As defined under:,::; Judicature Act 197: 
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Immigration Act 1964 did not contain any express exclusion of the ptinciples of 
natural justice.32 Therefore an inference could be drawn that the obligations to 
comply with the rules of natural justice or fairness were applicable to the 
Minister's discretion under the Immigration Act 1964. 
IV THE IMMIGRATION ACT 1987 
Any person who is not a New Zealand citizen may only lawfully study, work or 
residt; in ~e\\- Zealand if they hold a permit33 or if they are specifically exempt 
under the Immigration Act 1987. 34 The Immigration Act 1987 provides the 
essential legal framework within which immigration policies are given effect, but 
important policy considerations are not bound by the statute. The Act defines 
who is subject to immigration controP~ and who needs approval to enter or 
remain in New Zealand.36 It also confers the necessary decision making and 
enforcement powers upon the immigration authorities, and provides appeal 
procedures. In the Immigration Amendment Act 1991 increased appeal 
procedures were provided for with the establishment of the Residence Appeal 
Authority and the Removal Review Authority. 37 
32Wiseman v Borneman [1971) AC 297, 318," .... the legislature may certainly exclude or limit the 
application of the general rules . But it has always been insisted that this must be done, clearly 
and expressly ... " per Lord Wilberforce. 
33Toere are vanous types of permits available under s 24 Immigration Act 1987. For example 
residence, work, temporary, or student permits. Conditions vary according to the type of permit. 
A visa is not a permit, it is merely an endorsement by a visa officer that at the time of issue the 
officer knew of no reason why the holder should not be granted a permit. A visa does not entitle 
the holder to a permit as of right, s J 4 lmrrugrat:Ion Act 1987. 
34 Sections 11-13 Immigration Act 1987 For example; citizens of Australia, diplomats, member 
of crew or passenger of craft in the course of its ordinary business, member of scientific 
expedition in the Ross Dependency associated with the Antarctica Act 1960. 
35 Sect:Ion 3. Irmrugration Act 1987. 
36Sec1J.on 4, Immigration Act 1987. 
37 Sections 18B and 63 Immigration Amendment Act 1991 . 
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The Act's purpose was to reform the law relating to immigration and in particular 
to remove illegal immigrants through the civil jurisdiction of the District Court 
rather than by way of criminal prosecution. Another major distinction from the 
1964 Act is that although the permit system is retained, pemrits are now required 
for people who wish "to be in New Zealand"38 rather than to enter New Zealand. 
A Grant of a Residence Permit 
No person is entitled to a residence permit as of right. 39 Section 8 of the 
Immigration Amendment Act 1991 states that the question of whether or not to 
grant a residence permit is a matter of discretion for the Minister. No appeal on 
the facts shall lie against any decision the Minister makes pursuant to the granting 
of a residence pemrit. 40 This does not affect or limit the right to review the 
proceedings. As provided for in the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
Immigration officers are grven special delegation under the Act to also grant 
residency permits.41 But they are subject to section 13C of the 1991 Act, which 
states that they must comply with Government residency policy.42 Immigration 
officers decisions are also subject to appeals to the Residence Appeal Authority.43 
An applicant can appeal to the Authority where an immigration officer has 
refused to grant a residency pemrit on two grounds. That the refusal was not 
38Section 4 lrnmigration Act 1987. 
39Section 8(1)( a) Immigration Amendment Act 1991. 
40Section 8(2) Immigration Amendment Act I 091 
41 Section 41 lmmigration Amendment Act 1991. 
42The rules and criteria under which the eligibility for the granting of permits is to assessed is 
published as the Government's irmrugration policy in a manual which is available to the public for 
inspection.. free of charge, at offices of the Department of Labour. Tius JS pursuant to s 13A 
Immigration Amendment Act 1991 . 
43 Section 18c lrnmigration Amendment Act 1991 . 
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correct in terms of Government residence policy which was applicable at the time 
of application for the permit. 44 The other ground is that the special circumstances 
of the appellant are such that an exception to the Government residence policy 
should be considered. 45 
While only the applicant can appea] to the Residence Appea] Authority, either 
party can appeal to the High Court if they are dissatisfied with the decision of the 
Authority. 46 Appeals to the High Court can only be based on dissatisfaction with 
the appeal proceedings being erroneous in law, the party may only appeal on that 
question oflaw. 47 An appeal to the Court of Appeal by leave may be granted to 
any party who is dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court on a point of 
law.48 
The 1991 Amendment Act established grounds of appeal for decisions which 
refused to grant a residency permit, only when that decision was made by an 
immigration officer. The only ground for review of the Minister's decision not to 
grant a residency permit is under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, review of 
proceedings. It is important to note that the Minister is not bound by 
Government residence policy. The Minister may grant or refuse a permit as the 
Minister thinks fit, whether this is an exception to policy or not. 49 Therefore the 
Ministers decisions are fettered only by the rules and precedents of judicial 
review. 
44 Section 18C(I)(a) Immigration Amendment Act 1991. 
45 Section 18c(l)(b) Immigration Amendment Act 1991. 
46Either the applicant or the Secretary of Labour can appeal the Authoriues decision. 
47Section 115 Immigration Amendment Act 1901. 
48Section 116 Immigration Amendment Act 190 I 
49 Section 35 Immigration Act 1987, s l 3c(2) Immigration Amendment Act I 99 I . 
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B Removal Warrants. 
Where people are in New Zealand illegally a removal order can be made by either 
the Secretary of Labour or a designated immigration officer. 50 The 1991 
Amendment Act establishes the Removal Review Authority which hears appeals 
on the ground that the removal order should be cancelled because the person is 
not in New Zealand illegally. 51 Determination of the appeal on this ground is 
based on whether the applicant's situation falls within the statutory framework of 
being in New Zealand legally. 52 
Under section 63B of the 1991 Amendment Act any person on whom a removal 
order is served can appeal the order on the ground that because of exceptional 
circumstances of a humanitarian nature, it would be unjust or unduly harsh to 
remove the person from New Zealand. 53 Section 63B(3) states that if a person's 
circumstances are such that they would meet the applicable criteria of the 
Governments residence policy for the granting of a residence permit this in itself 
does not constitute "exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature". 54 When 
the Removal Review Authority is considering an appeal on grounds of a 
humanitarian nature they must be satisfied that to allow the person to stay in New 
Zealand would not be contrary to the public interest. 55 
50 Section 50 Immigration Amendment Act 1991. 
51 Section 63A Immigration Amendment Act 1991 
52For example is that person a New Zealand citizen, holds a valid pennit, or are exempt under the 
Act. 
53 Section 63B(2)(a) Immigration Amendment Act 1991 . 
54Section 63B(3) Immigration Amendment Act 1991 . 
55 Section 63B(2)(b) Immigration Amendment Act 1991 . 
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Appeals from either party to a decision by the removal Review Authority on a 
point of law can be made to the High Court. 56 Leave to appeal to the Cow1 of 
Appeal on a point of law is granted under section 116 of the Amendment Act 
1991. 
C Summary 
New Zealand immigration law is governed by legislation which rigidly preserves 
the unfettered discretion of the Minister of Immigration to make decisions 
concerning the migration of people into New Zealand. Ministerial decisions are 
only reviewable on a basis of judicial review. Appeals from decisions by 
immigration officers to the High Court and Court of Appeal are only allowable on 
points of law. The appeal procedure established by the Act reinforces the 
importance of the courts role in the judicial review of immigration cases. 
The Act does not set out specific criteria for admission to New Zealand, or the 
specific terms and conditions of when it will be granted. 57 The substantive 
aspects of the law of immigration are found in Governmental immigration policy 
published in the Department of Labour's Manual of Immigration Instructions, 
together with the decisions of the immigration appeal authorities and the courts. 
The policy in relation to applications for residency permits is required by statute 
to be complied with by immigration officers. Therefore this policy is the basis for 
most family reunification decisions. 
56Section 115A Immigration Amendment Act 1991 
57The Act does specify some instances when it ·will not be granted. Section 7 states that certain 
people are not eligible for permits. 1bis includes anyone who has been conVIcted of any offence 
and served 5 years imprisonment, anyone the Minister has reason to believe is likely to cornrrut 
an offence against the Crimes Act 1961 or the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, and for that or any 
other reason the Minister considers would constitute a threat to the public interest or public order. 
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Through a closer examination of the 1987 Immigration Act and Amendments the 
significance of common law judicial review cases in the area and Governmental 
policy is now clear. These two areas will now be looked at in greater depth to 
determine how they impact on residency applications based on family 
reunification. 
V GOVERN11ENT RESIDENCE POLICY 
An insight into the aims of current New Zealand immigration policy can be 
obtained through the Labour Department's Manual of Immigration Instructions. ss 
The substance of New Zealand immigration policy is designed to attract quality 
migrants in greater numbers from a wider group of countries. The manual states 
that the principal goals of policy are; 
1. To allow entry to those migrants who will make the highest 
contributions to employment and income growth. 
2. To maximise the gain in productive human capital while 
maintaining provisions for migrants to enter New Zealand for social and 
humanitarian reasons. 
These are the basic principles that Government residency policy is attempting to 
enforce. A more detailed look at the policy instructions will show what this 
means for families and individual family members involved in the immigration 
process in New Zealand. The manual of immigration instructions sets out specific 
58The manual is available for public perusal at all officers of the Labour Department. Section 13A 
Immigration Amendment Act 1991 . 
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criteria applicants have to satisfy to be eligible for a residency permit. Bearing in 
mind that the Immigration Service is bound by statute to comply with immigration 
policy. ' 9 
Prospective migrants can apply for permanent residence under four categories 
stated within Governmental policy; 
1. General Category. Applicants are assessed and ranked under a 
points system according to the applicants qualifications, work experience, 
age and settlement factors. 60 
2. Business Investment Category. Applicants are assessed on their 
skills, work or business experience, and their ability to invest funds into 
New Zealand. 
3. Family Category. Those who wish to migrate to New Zealand 
because they are related to, or have a genuine relationship with, a New 
Zealand citizen or resident. How a nation defines the 'family' is of 
primary importance in developing its immigration policy. 
4. Humanitarian Category. For people whose circumstances are 
exceptionally difficult and can only be resolved by being granted residence 
in New Zealand, and who have a close family connection in New 
Zealand. 
59Section 13c Immigration Amendment Act 1991 . 
60"Settlement factors'' include assets and financial investments. 
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For all the above categmies there arc the compulsory requirements of a character 
clearance61 and health certificates to ensure the applicant is of good health. 
Governmental policy on the granting of a residence permit on family and 
humanitarian grounds will be further reviewed. 
A The Fami~y Category 
There are two broad aims of the f arnily category policy stated in the immigration 
policy manual; 
1. To permit New Zealand citizens or residents to be joined in New 
Zealand by their spouses, or partners. 
2. To provide avenues. through which immigrants who have already 
settled in New Zealand may sponsor the entry of other eligible members of 
their immediate family and help them settle by providing practical and 
emotional support. This includes New Zealand citizens or permanent 
residents being joined by their parents or dependant children. 
These categories can be summarised as family reunification through being related 
or having a genuine relationship with a New Zealand citizen or resident. 
B Genuine Relationship 
If an applicant is in a partnership with a New Zealand citizen or resident they may 
apply under this category for residency. The partnership must be either a 
61 Tilis is to ensure that the applicant does not come within section 7(1) Immigration Act 1987 
category of people who are not eligible for a perrrut. 
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marriage, de facto relationship, or homosexual partnership living together. The 
criteria stated in Governmental policy which must be satisfied is that; 
1. There is evidence that the partner is a New Zealand citizen or 
resident, 
2. that there is evidence that the partner supports the application, 
3. and that the couple are living together in a genuine and stable 
relationship. 62 
The first two criteria are usually satisfied easily by the provision of a passport or 
permanent residence permit and a letter confirnting that the partner supports the 
application. 
The term 'genuine and stable relationship' has specific meaning in immigration 
terms based on the fulfilment of various criteria in the departmental manual. 
Assessment of a particular partnership as to whether it is 'genuine and stable' 
differs depending on the type of relationship it is. 
In the case of marriage it is not automatically assumed that due to a valid marriage 
certificate the relationship is genuine and stable. Immigration officers must 
consider the intention of the parties at the time of marriage, that there was a 
genuine intention of maintaining a long-term, exclusive relationship. Usually 
immigrations officers will assume the marriage to be genuine unless there is 
evidence to the contrary. This is where the duration of the marriage may be seen 
62Departmenta1 Manual of Immigration Instructions. Department of Labour, Immigration 
Service. 
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as evidence of a sham mamage. If immigration officers suspect a sham maniage 
the married couple must produce evidence to prove that the marriage is genuine. 
Evidence of the duration of a partnership is a prerequisite for homosex'llal and de 
facto partnerships. The duration of a marriage is only an issue when, as stated 
above, it is of such short duration that it leads the immigration officers to suspect 
that the marriage is not genuine or stable. Before homosex'Ual and de facto 
relationships can be assessed as being genuine and stable based on documentary 
evidence they must satisfy an arbitrary duration requirement. The time period 
which must be proved varies depending on the type of partnership involved. In 
the case of a de facto relationship there must be evidence of at least a two year 
duration of this 'genuine and stable' relationship. In the case of homosexual 
partners they must produce evidence proving a four year relationship. 
The Departmental Manual suggests that to prove the duration of a relationship or 
to show that it is genuine and stable the applicant should produce "as many 
documents as possible". 63 Suggested documents include; photos, letters, proof of 
shared accommodation (joint tenancy agreements), proof of shared income (bank 
statements), evidence of public or family recognition of the relationship. The onus 
is on the applicant to produce this evidence to satisfy the immigration service. 
Usually interviews of both the applicant and the partner will also be conducted by 
the immigration service in detenn.ining the true nature of the relationship. 
The duration times used as detennination factors in assessing if a relationship is 
genuine and stable are completely arbitrary. \\Thy for a homose)s.-ual relationship to 
63 Above n 62. 
lAW UBRARY 
f1CTORIA UWI/ETlt,rf.\' OF VVELLINGTOJI 
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be considered genuine and stable by an immigration officer must there be 
evidence that the partners have been together for four years?. Why are there 
different criteria for assessing homose:\.'Ual and heterosexual relationships as 
genuine and stable?. Why are the requirements much more onerous on a 
homosexual couple?. None of these questions are satisfactorily answered by 
Government residency policy at the moment. The assessment criteria are biased 
and discriminatory. The present system makes it easier for people in the 
relationship of marriage to obtain residency because they have less criteria to 
establish than do people in de facto or homosexual relationships. 
In observance of the International Year of the Family the New Zealand 
Immigration Service has produced an educational information kit on current 
immigration policy involving families. 64 The last three to five years has seen the 
public sector acquire more of a private sector type structure and organisation. 
Eighteen months ago the Immigration Service established a 'rolling programme' 
for policy review. The aim of this programme is that all policy will be 
systematically reviewed every three to four years. Previously review of policy was 
done completely on an ad hoe bases. The present 'rolling programmes' time 
structure will see all immigration policy reviewed by 1998. Family reunification 
policy is scheduled for a full review staring the first of July 1995 and running 
through to mid 1996. 63 
Family reunification policy has not been reviewed since 1988, this review resulted 
in the introduction of the de facto and homosexual partnership categories. The 
increase in New Zealand's commitment to the preservation of fundamental rights 
64Capital Letter vol 17 no 20 1994, 3. 
65 lnterview with Marion Little, Policy Analyst for the Irmmgration Service, 20 September 1994 
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and freedoms and the unlawfulness of discrimination is evidenced by the 
enactment of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. This 
has a direct relationship with the views expressed by the New Zealand public 
concerning discrimination in our society. The Immigration Service will be taking 
these changing public perceptions into account when it reconsiders family 
reunification policy in 1995. 66 
With the enactment of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Right'> Act 
1993 it is interesting to consider the possible relief these statutes may provide for 
the present Government residency policy. 
1 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The Bill of Rights specifically states that it applies to acts done by the executive. 67 
hnrnigration policy is clearly formulated by the executive branch of Government. 
Immigration officers are also bound by the Bill of Rights when carrying out their 
duties prescribed under the Inunigration Act 1987. For example being bound by 
statute to follow the Government's residency policy. 68 Under section 19(1) of the 
Bill of Rights Act everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the 
grounds of discrimination stated in the Human Rights Act 1993. These grounds 
include sexual orientation and marital status. Marital status is defined in the 
Human Rights Act to include "living in a relationship in the nature of a 
marriage. "69 This definition leaves no doubt that de facto relationships are 
66 Above n 65. 
67Section 3(a) Bill ofRie-hu; Act 1900 
68Section 3(b) Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
69Section 2l(l)(b) Human Rights Act 1993. 
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protected from discrimination under the Human Rights Act and the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
The Bill of Rights Act refers to "everyone" having the right to freedom from 
discrimination on the grounds stated above. This clearly confers the right on New 
Zealand citizens and residents. It is likely that the "everyone" will be interpreted 
by the Courts as everyone in New Zealand. Evidence of this is in section 12 
which specifically states that "every New Zealand citizen who is over the age of 18 
years" has the right to vote in an election. The rest of the Act prescribes rights to 
"everyone", therefore it is arguable that everyone is not only a New Zealand 
citizen, but the rights are owed to all people in New Zealand. Even if the potential 
migrant is not conferred with the rights of the Act, the New Zealand partner is 
having their rights breached under the Act.. 
Rights contained in the Bill of Rights Act may be subject to reasonable limits 
prescribed by law, so long as those limits can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. 70 Under section 5 the courts must make a calculation 
as to where the balance of public welfare lies between unrestricted enjoyment of a 
particular right or freedom, and any limitations on it. 71 When the courts consider 
a breach of rights under the Bill of Rights Act, due to discriminatory immigration 
policy, they will have to weigh up the public benefit conferred by limiting the right 
against the unrestricted enjoyment of that right. This type of question may 
necessitate the broadening of the judicial inquiry to accommodate the "Brandeis 
70Secbon 5 Bill of Rights 1990. 
71 Joseph PA Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Company 
Limited, Brisbane, 1993) 859. 
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Brief. "72 This is a technique which brings before the court a whole raft of 
sociological evidence comprising statistical data, departmental reports, econormc 
implications of decisions and expert evidence relevant to the inquiry. 73 
Therefore although questions of discrimination in immigration cases clearly fall 
within the ambit and purpose of the Bill of Rights Act, under section 5 there may 
be justifiable limits placed on ones rights in the public interest. Immigration is an 
area which often focuses on balancing individual interests with those of public 
welfare. Immigration legislation and policy is concerned that no migrant will be a 
burden on. or injurious to New Zealand society. 74 
The Bill of Rights does not make any express provision in respect of remedies, 
where its rights and freedoms have been found to be breached. It has been 
suggested in common law that the Act therefore impliedly empowers the courts to 
grant whatever remedies may be appropriate to safeguard the rights infringed on in 
each particular case. 75 But there is a degree of uncertainty surrounding the 
possible remedies available under the Bill of Rights Act. 
72This brief acquired its name from Louis D Brandeis counsel before the American Supreme 
Court m the case of Muller v Oregon 203 US 412 (1908). Mr Brandeis adduced copious evidence 
in the defence of a state statute which declared that the right to sell ones labour under the 
Fourteenth Amendment could lawfully be subjected to restrictions for reasons of public welfare. 
73 Above n 71, 859. · 
74For examples 7 lrnmigration Act 1987, persons not eligible for a permit; and s 63B lrrnrugration 
Amendment Act 1991 , no appeal on humanitarian grounds if it would be contrary to the public 
interest. 
npafmer vAuckland Maximum Security Prison [1991] 3 NZLR 315, 318. 
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2 Human Rights Act 1993 
The Human Rights Act 1993 states that it is unlawful to discriminate against 
anyone on the grounds of marital status or sexual orientation. 76 Complaints about 
unlawful discrimination can be investigated by the Human Rights Commission. 
Any act, requirement, condition or practice which has the effect of giving 
different treatment to a group, on the bases of any of the grounds of 
discrimination stated in section 21 of the Act, can be investigated. 77 
An investigation of unlawful discrimination may go through various procedures 
including the Complaints Review Tribunal, High Court and Court of Appeal. An 
appeal to the Court of Appeal will only be granted on a question of law. The 
remedies available to the complainant are clearly set out in the Act. 78 These 
include an order restraining the defendant from continuing or repeating the 
breach, an order that the defendant perform any acts specified in the order with a 
view to redressing any damage suffered. 79 Damages can also be awarded to 
compensate for pecuniary loss, loss of benefit and any humiliation of injury to 
feelings suffered by the complainant. 80 Proceedings brought under the Act are 
civil and therefore the burden of proof to be satisfied is that of the balance of 
probabilities. 
The specific wording of the Human Rights Act, with regards to discrimination on 
the grounds of marital status or sexual orientation, is encouraging as to how the 
76Section 21 Human Rights Act 1993. Clearly includes discrimination on the grounds of being in 
a de facto relationship. 
77Sections 13 and 75(e) Human Rights Act 1993. 
78Sections 86 - 92 Human Rights Act 1993 
79Section 86 Human Rights Act 1993. 
80Section 88 Human Rights Act 1993. 
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courts may interpret the statute with regards the issue of immigration policy. 
There is no corresponding Bill of Rights Act section 5 in the Human Rights Act. 
Tus lessens the possibility of the courts regarding the public interest as a reason 
for lawfully fettering an individuals rights to non-discrimination. The remedies 
clearly expressed in the statute are also an advantage over the uncertainty 
revolving around possible remedies under the Bill of Rights Act. 
The Human Rights Act clearly binds the Crown. 81 But how far the courts are 
willing to go in enforcing the statutory rights expressed in the Human Rights Act 
over acts of the Crown which have previously been seen as part of Royal 
prerogative is debatable. Recent developments by the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in judicial review cases may indicate that the courts are now more willingly 
to enforce issues of human rights on the discretionary power of the 1'1inister in 
immigration cases. 82 
C Family Reunion 
When applying under the family reunion category the applicant needs to have a 
sponsor living in New Zealand lawfully and permanently. The definition of family 
in this category is modelled on the Western nuclear family. To qualify for 
residence under the family reunion policy an applicant must have parents, 
dependant children, single adult brothers or sisters resident in New Zealand. 
81 Section 3 Human Rights Act 1993. 
82For further discussion on this matter see section VII, How judicial review is applied in 
Immigration Cases. 
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If you are a parent you are eligible to be reunited with your adult children if the 
parents can satisfy the "centre of gravity" principle. 83 This basically means that 
you have an equal or greater number of children living lawfully in New Zealand as 
any where else in the world. 
Unmani.ed dependent children under 17 years of age are eligible for residence if 
they are joining their parents in New Zealand and they have no children of their 
own. 84 Single adult brothers, sisters, and children of New Zealand citizens or 
residents are eligible for residence provided they have no children and are 
permanently alone in their home country. 85 
This category of family reunion is governed by what the Government of the day 
believes to constitute a family. The present definition is based on the small 
nuclear type of family and it does not reflect New Zealand's bicultural nature. 
There is no consideration given in residency policy to other definitions of the 
family which are widely held in New Zealand, such as the extended family. This 
in some ways makes the family category an anomaly as the aim of such policy is to 
encourage family reunification. But the definition of family is so restrictive that 
many family ties and bonds are not catered for. 
1 Humanitarian category 
A further allowance is made for family reunification on the ground that the 
application is of a humanitarian nature. The application must be supported by a 
83 See Appendix I. 
84Wllo are lawfully and permanently in New Zealand. 
85This includes widowed or divorced. 
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close family member who is a New Zealand citizen or resident. The criteria stated 
in the Governmental policy for an applicant to qualify for approval under the 
humanitarian category include, that their circumstances are of a degree that is 
causing serious physical or emotional harm to themselves or a New Zealand party. 
The applicant must produce evidence that their situation can only be resolved by 
being granted a New Zealand residence. Finally the immigration service must be 
satisfied that, under these circumstances, approval would not be contrary to the 
public interest. 
2 Adoption cases and family reunion 
'A close family member' is not defined in the residency policy. In the cases of 
Application by Webster86 and Re Adoption of Patef81 sponsorship of nephews by 
their uncles and aunts were considered to fall within the 'close family member' 
requirement. Residence pennits were not granted in these cases, as the other 
criteria needed for satisfying the hwnanitarian category were not fulfilled. 
These adoption cases reveal the limitations of the family reunion category. There 
are several cases which have come before the courts as adoption cases with 
overtones that the main reason they are there is so the child will not be deported. 
This paper will not explore the implications of adoption apart from saying that it 
severs all legal ties between a child and natural parents and therefore must not be 
entered into but for the welfare of the child. It demonstrates the inadequacies of 
family reunion immigration policy if families are forced to take drastic steps such 
as adoption to ensure family members can la\\1fully stay in New Zealand. 
86[1991) NZFLR 537. 
87(1991] NZFLR 512. 
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The court in Re Adoption Patel88 and Application by Webster89 stated that it 
would not grant an adoption order if the primary purpose of the adoption 
application was to obtain New Zealand citizenship for the child. 90 But in both 
cases it was admitted that immigration concerns were a motivation in bringing the 
application. Immigration issues should not be a factor in considering an adoption 
order, these concerns would be better meet by an extension to the family 
reunification policy. 
The facts of the above cases reveal that perhaps immigration concerns played 
more part in granting the adoption order, than did consideration to the 
extinguishing of the existing legal family relationship and reconstruction of a new 
family unit. In Re Adoption Patel the child was 19 and the aunt and uncle who 
made the application were 63 and 76 years of age. The child had lived with the 
applicants for three years. The natural parents in this case were alive and well and 
resident in India. It was intended that the child still have contact with the natural 
parents. At the time of the Family Court decision the child was in New Zealand 
illegally. 91 The child stated that he would always regard his parents in India as his 
real parents and that he wanted to remain in New Zealand largely for economic 
reasons.92 The court in Re A doption Patel stated that the dominant motive in this 
case was not to enable the child to reside in New Zealand It is respectively 
submitted that on the facts of this case the child's welfare was based on economic 
considerations which were contingent of the child residing in New Zealand. 
88 Above n 86. 
89 Above n 87. 
90See above n 86. 539 and n 87,515. 
91 Above 87,513. 
92 Above 8'7 5 I 4 
' 
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In Application by Webster the child was 18. The child's mother was dead and his 
father was living in poor conditions in Fiji. Three public policy principles were 
accepted by the court. Firstly, should an adoption order be made if there are other 
methods available to the court to give the child a secure and settled family life. 
Secondly, in relation to adoption by relatives, because it severs legal family ties 
on one side and distorts family relationships on the other, adoption should not be 
considered desirable unless the benefits gained by the adoption cannot be met by 
other means. Finally, if adoption is purely for immigration purposes the adoption 
should be refused. 93 These principles show that if the courts had an alternative to 
an adoption order which would meet the needs of the child then that should be 
taken, rather than severing family legal ties. This could easily be satisfied though 
changes to family reunification policy. 
To reiterate the point that often immigration issues are prevalent in adoption cases 
and that this is not a proper forum for them, Boshier J stated in the 1992 case of 
In the Adoption of L;94 
L faces a Removal Warrant pursuant to the Immigration Act. 111is is a 
consideration for me, it rather forces my hand to adjudicate upon this 
application and not defer it and look for other possibilities. I really have no 
choice but to firmly grip this application and decide it one way or the other. 
I know that if I do not grant it (the adoption order) L will be removed and 
to back to Tonga. 
93 Above n 86, 539. 
94(1992] NZFLR 847, 849. 
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The facts of this case make it more disntrbing that the judge felt that his hand had 
been forced in deciding an adoption order due to the spectre of a Removal 
Warrant. The applicant applied to adopt her four year old nephew who was 
Tongan but had been living in New Zealand for two years, half of his life. The 
applicants husband was serving a term of imprisonment but was soon due for 
release. The husband had previously demonstrated violence towards L. The 
judge was concerned about the effect the husband's release from prison might 
have on L. L had no suitable environment in Tonga into which he could be 
placed. The adoption order was granted even though there were concerns for the 
child's safety. 
An adoption order should not be a substitute for a Removal Warrant. It seems 
that these cases would be better dealt with in the context of immigration law and 
policy. If New Zealand's family reunion policy was extended to include a wider 
family grouping, adoption cases such as those cited above could be decided 
entirely by immigration law and never need to alter the family legal status of the 
child. 
VI JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of immigration control presents the question of who should decide 
what? It goes to the allocation of power between the judiciary, on the one hand, 
and the legislantre and executive on the other hand. This is the essence of the 
separation of powers doctrine which is a necessary condition of the rule of law. 
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Statute prescribes that :tv1inisteria1 decisions in immigration cases can onJy be 
reviewed by the courts though judicial review. 95 How the courts review 
immigration cases is therefore detennined on the scope of review allowed in 
administrative law. Administrative law and in particular judicial review has 
developed substantially in New Zealand over the last decade. From the decision 
of Chandra96 the courts have extended the grounds of review and therefore the 
scope of their authority. The principal grounds of review are illegality, irrationality 
and procedural unfairness. 97 These grounds are however neither exhaustive nor 
mutually exclusive. New Zealand judges have suggested substantive (as distinct 
from procedural) fairness as another possible ground for review. 98 
For the purposes of this paper the focus will be on the grounds of illegality and 
irrationality. A brief overview of these grounds of review will be followed by a 
closer examination of how these groundc;; have been interpreted by the courts in 
immigration cases. 
A Illegality 
Relevant considerations are encompassed within the area of illegality or ultra vires. 
Whenever an administrative authority fails to take into account relevant 
considerations it commits a reviewable error of law. The exercise of a 
discretionary power may be invalid if the decision maker is influenced by 
95 See section IV, Immigration Act 1987. 
96Above n 30. 
97Council of Civil Service Unions vMmister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374,410, per Lord 
Diplock. 
98See Canterbury Pipe Lines Ltd v Christchurch Drainage Board [ l 0 79] 2 NZLR 347, 357, per 
Woodhouse and Cooke JJ; Daganayasi vMinister of Immigration (1980] 2 NZLR 130, 149, per 
Cooke J. 
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considerations that ought not to be taken into account, or if the decision maker 
fails to take account of relevant considerations. 99 
The Court of Appeal in the case of CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-Genera/lOO 
discussed the requirement that a decision maker genuinely address relevant 
considerations. CREEDNZ adopted the approach that the relevant consideration 
need not be expressly stated but could be implied. The Court of Appeal quoted 
from Lord Greene's judgement in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v 
Wednesbury Corporation: 101 
If, in the statute confening the discretion., there is to be found expressly or 
by implication matters which the authority exercising the discretion ought 
to have regard to, then in exercising the discretion it must have regard to 
those matters. 
It is accepted in New Zealand law that relevant considerations need not be 
expressly listed in the statute but can arise through implication of the statutory 
scheme. Cooke J stated: "the more general and the more obviously important the 
consideration, the readier the court must be to hold that Parliament must have 
meant it to be taken into account. 11102 The more comprehensive the criteria listed 
in the statute the more likely the courts are to see this as exhaustive . If the 
criterion is open ended, for example the consideration of the public interest, the 
court may hold that the criteria are not exhaustive and can therefore be implied. 
Where criteria are not exhaustive or where none are specified, considerations 
99 Above n 71 , 679. 
100(1981) l NZLR 172. 
101 (1948) 1KB 223, 228. 
102Above 100 183 ' . 
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relevant to the exercise of discretion may be implied from the subject matter, 
purpose and scope of the empowering provision in the context of the legislative 
scheme. 103 
The courts need to detemrine what are the relevant considerations, expressed and 
implied which must be addressed by the decision maker. It is not for the court to 
substitute its own opinion for the decision makers. The court must establish that 
the decision maker considered the facts they were required to by law and then 
used their discretion. With every set of facts there are a number of possible 
outcomes. The courts can only look to see that the decision maker considered all 
they had to and then made their decision. These are the basic principles behind 
the reviewable ground of illegality and review of procedural fairness .. 
B Irrationality 
Following on from these established principles is the uncertain ground of 
irrationality or unreasonableness. This ground involves the courts determining a 
decision to be so unreasonable that the decision maker must have erred in law 
when making that decision. The original threshold for this test was that the court 
must consider the decision so outrageous that it appeared that the official must 
have "taken leave of his senses. "104 By applying this strict standard the courts 
were able to maintain the distinction between the legality (which is reviewable) 
and the merits (which are not reviewable) of a discretionary power. The courts 
would then not be usurping the policy functions given to the administrative 
103Above 71 , 680. 
104 R v Hillingdon London Borough Council; Ex parte Puh/hofer [ 1986) AC 484, 518, per Lord 
Brightman. 
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authority10~ In Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury 
Corporation106 the court followed the traditional thresho]d test that no reasonable 
person could have come to that decision. 
But this standard has been questioned and in some cases relaxed by courts. Some 
judges in New Zealand have proposed a standard of substantive fairness as the 
threshold for review. It is debatable whether the threshold in New Zealand for 
unreasonableness is that stated in the case of Wednesbury or that of substantive 
fairness. By examining recent New Zealand cases the position may be clarified. 
With particular relevance to family reunification issues is the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal case of Daganayasi v Minister of lmmigration. 107 The facts of this 
case are that the applicant had unsuccessfully applied for a permanent residence 
permit. She was convicted of remaining in New Zealand after her temporary 
permit had expired. An automatic consequence of this conviction was her 
deportation. The appellant appealed against deportation under section 20A of the 
Immigration Act 1964. 108 This section gave the Minister the discretion to order 
that the off ender not be deported if the Minister was convinced that the case was 
one which presented exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature which 
would render deportation unduly harsh or unjust. The appellants main ground for 
appeal was that one of her New Zealand born children had a rare metabolic 
disease and had to remain in New Zealand to receive the proper medica] 
treatment. 109 
105 Above n 71, 705. 
106(1948) 1 KB 223. 
107[1980) 2 NZLR 130. 
108As amended in 1977. 
109nus was the same ground as had been advanced for the unsuccessful permanent residence 
permit 
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Cooke J in delivering the principle judgement, suggested the possibility of 
substantive, as distinct from procedura~ fairness as a ground for judicial review. 
The Cowt of Appeal was divided on the issue of mistake of fact, Cooke J 
followed Scarman L J in the House of Lords case of T ameside. 110 Scarman L J 
stated that a discretionary power could not be exercised through a 
"misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact. "lll Richmond 
P and Richardson J, in Daganayasi, reserved their opinion commenting this area 
of the law was far from settled. 112 
Whether the New Zealand courts will apply the Wednesbury threshold test of 
unreasonableness or the Daganayasi type of procedural unfairness remains a 
moot point. Cases which have broached the issue are divided and inconclusive. 113 
In the case of Chan v Minister of Immigration 114 the H.igh Court adopted an even 
broader view of reasonableness than Daganayasi. The cowt found that the 
M.inister had failed to give the proper weight to the relevant factors and therefore 
quashed the decision. 
This area of judicial review while legitimate, but uncertain, has wide reaching 
affects on imm.igration cases. If a Daganayasi substantive approach is taken the 
courts powers of review are extended and therefore the M.inister's discretional 
power is more fettered. This would result in imm.igration cases being open to 
judicial review on the substantive facts rather than just on procedural questions. 
110Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Borough [1 977] AC 1014. 111Above n 110, 1030. 
112Above n 107, 149. 
113See for example Fowler & Roderzque Ltd vAttorney-General [1987] 2 NZLR 56 (CA), New 
Zealand Fishing Industry Association Inc v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries[1988] 1 
NZLR 544 (CA). 
114Umeported, 8 May 1989, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 80/89. 
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VII HOW JUDICIAL REVIEW IS APPLIED IN IMI'v1IGRA TION CASES 
New Zealand's common law has established that illegality and irrationality are 
grounds for judicial review in immigration cases. How are these grounds 
interpreted by the courts in the case of immigration issues?. By examining several 
recent New Zealand cases a more detailed analysis of how judicial review impacts 
on immigration can be formed . For example cases establish what relevant 
considerations the Minister is required to consider. 
A Ashby v Minister of lmmigration115 
In Ashby v Minister of Immigration the Court of Appeal was required to consider 
the legitimacy of the Minister's decision to issue temporary visitors permits to the 
members of the Springbok rugby team. The first issue was whether the scope of 
the Minister's discretionary powers could only be exercised in conformity with 
New Zealand's international obligations under the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965.116 The second issue 
was that the obligations of the Convention were relevant considerations which the 
Minister of Immigration had to take account of. 
Cooke J dismissed the first argument by stating that the l\1inister could not be 
bound by the international treaty obligations because they were not binding on 
domestic law until they had been incorporated into New Zealand law by an Act of 
Parliament. 111 Somers and Richardson JJ, also dismissed this argument, but on 
115(1981 ) I NZLR 222 . 
116New Zealand ratified this Convention on 22 ovember 1972. 
11 7Aboven 115, 224. 
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different grounds. Richardson J stated that whenever possible statutes are to be 
construed so as to accord with New Zealand's international obligations, but if the 
terms of the legislation are clear and unambiguous they must be given effect, 
whether or not they comply with international obligations. 118 A quote which 
summarised this point was given from the dissenting judgement of Scarman LJ 
Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority: 119 
Today, therefore we have to construe and apply section 30 not against the 
background of the law and society of 1944 but in a multi-racial society 
which has accepted international obligations and enacted statutes designed 
to eliminate discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, colour or sex. 
Further, it is no longer possible to argue that because the international treaty 
obligations of the United kingdom do not become law unless enacted by 
Parliament our courts pay no regard to our international obligations. They 
pay very serious regard to them: in particular, they will interpret statutory 
language and apply common law principles, wherever possible, so as to 
reach a conclusion consistent with our international obligations. 
Richardson J found that the language of the statute was clear and unequivocal and 
did not expressly fetter the Minister's discretion in any way. 
The question of whether the International Convention was a relevant consideration 
which the 1v1inister had to take account of was dismissed on various grounds. 
Cooke J found that the Convention would only have to be considered by the 
Minister where it was of "such oveiwhelming or manifest importance that the 
118Above n 115, 227. 
119[1978] QB, 36,48; (1978] 1 All ER 574, 583. 
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Courts might hold that Parliament could not possibly have meant to allow it to be 
ignored. "120 In this particular case the Convention was found not to fall within this 
category. The Chief Justice in the High Court had found that the Convention was 
a relevant consideration. 
The arguments presented in this case were mostly considered under the principles 
of illegality. Cooke J did mention that in a situation where there was found to be a 
relevant consideration then the question of irrationality would be asked. Could a 
reasonable Minister overlook that consideration or reach that result. 121 
Ashby is an important case as it establishes the possibility that in some immigration 
cases obligations incurred from international conventions may be relevant 
considerations. The ground on which the arguments failed was not that there 
was no case for the court to answer. It was decided on the particular facts of this 
case. This left the opportunity for the development of relevant considerations in 
immigration cases to be extended. 
B T avita v Minister of I mmigration122 
Mr Viliamu Tavita arrived in New Zealand in 1987 on a temporary visitors permit. 
His application for residency was declined and he was issued with a removal 
warrant. Mr Tavita appealed under section 63 of the Immigration Act 1987 for 
the Minister to cancel the removal warrant on humanitarian grounds, this appeal 
was declined. During the time the Minister was considering this appeal Mr T avita 
120 Above n 115, 226. 
121 Above n 115, 226. 
122Unreported, 30 November 1993, Court of Appeal, CA 266193. 
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and his wife had a child. As the child was born in New Zealand she is a New 
Zealand citizen, pursuant to section 6 Citizenship Act 1977. Mr Tavita's wife has 
applied for permanent residency and her application is being considered. 
Judicial review proceedings were commenced in the Court of Appeal where the 
question of the applicability of certain international conventions was raised. 
Reliance was placed on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 123 The court was asked to 
consider whether the obligations established by these international instruments 
were relevant considerations the :Minister had to take account of. The primary 
provisions of the Covenant invoked by the applicant are Articles 23(1) and 
24(1): 124 
Art. 23(1).The family is the natural and fundamental group unit 
of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 
Art. 24(1).Every child shall have, without any discrimination 
as to race, colour, ... national or social origin ... the right to such 
measures of protection as are required by his status as a 
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State. 
The provision invoked by the applicant from the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child is Article 9(1): 
123New Zealand ratified the Covenant on 20 December 1978 and the Optional Protocol, which 
gives individuals who have exhausted all available domestic remedies the right to apply to the 
Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, on 26 May 1989. The Convention on the 
Rights ofthe Child was ratified by New Zealand on 13 March 1993. 
124 Above n 122, 7. 
( 1) States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be 
separated from his or her parents against their will, except when 
competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in 
accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such 
separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such 
determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one 
involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one 
where the parents are living separately and a decision must be 
made as to the child's place of residence. 
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The two issues the court was required to consider in determining whether these 
international obligations were relevant considerations was to what extent 
international law can be invoked in domestic law and whether these obligations 
could be said to be impliedly relevant to the legislation. 
The Crown argued that there was no legal obligation to take the international 
instruments into account. Cooke P, in delivering the single judgement, stated that 
this was an "unattractive argument, apparently implying that New Zealand's 
adherence to the international instruments has been at least partly window-
dressing. "125 
The Crown cited Reg v Secretary for the Home Department, ex parte Brmd126 
in support of their proposition. His Honour distinguished Brind from Tavita on 
the facts. In Brind the Secretary of State had considered the European 
Convention, therefore the issue was whether the decision maker was bound to 
125 Above n 1 ~2, 14-15. 
126(1991] I AC 696. 
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conform to the obligations of the Convention. Lord Ackner stated that if this 
proposition was accepted it would result in the courts incorporating the 
Convention into English domestic law. 127 This is similar to the argument 
advanced by the applicants in Ashby, in both cases the courts concurred. Somers 
Jin Ashby observed that to accede to the applicants submission, that the Minister 
had to conform with the obligations of the Convention, "would not be to interpret 
but to legislate. "128 
Jn Tavita the Minister admitted that the international conventions had not even 
been considered. It was not a question of whether the Minister was bound by 
these obligations but whether he was required to consider the Conventions. The 
difference between these two submissions is fundamental to the authority of the 
courts in judicial review cases Judicial review of a relevant consideration is based 
on the procedural illegality of a decision, this is a question of law. The submission 
that the decision maker is bound by the obligations is requiring the courts to 
interpret international law to be a part of domestic law. This would result in the 
courts effectively legislating. 
The Court of Appeal in Ashby had accepted the principal that there were "some 
international obligations so manifestly important that no reasonable Minister could 
fail to take them into account. "129 From this premise Cooke P proceeded in 
Tavita to question when an Act is silent on relevant considerations whether 
international obligations are required to be considered. Cooke P suggested that "a 
failure to give practicaJ effect to the international instruments to which New 
127Aboven 126,761. 
128Above n 115, 23~. 
129Above n 122, 15. 
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Zealand is a party may attract criticism. "130 The judgement also states that courts 
may receive legitimate criticism if they accept the executive ignoring international 
human rights or obligations when exercising discretionary powers prescribed by 
domestic statutes. Even if the power was conferred in general terms and the 
statute does not mention international instruments. Although a final decision on 
the argument, of whether the decision maker was entitled to ignore international 
instruments, was not reached the Court of Appeal made very strong references to 
it not being accepted .. 
The case was ref erred back to the Minister for reconsideration in the light of the 
new fact of Mr Tavita's New Zealand born child. The court stated that the future 
of the child as a New Zealand citizen was a responsibility of this country and 
therefore international human rights and obligations were involved. The court 
gave the Minister the opportunity to consider the rights of the child. 131 
Cooke P suggested that the case could "be seen as dependant on its own facts ." 
But His Honour also indicated that it "emerges as a case of possible far-reaching 
implications. "132 It is arguable that Tavita establishes that in cases concerned with 
family reunification the decision maker must consider relevant international 
instruments. For example the rights of children and the right to the protection of 
the family. 133 The Court of Appeal seems to be indicating that in cases of family 
reunification the considerations of the relevant international human rights 
obligations were so manifestly important that the decision maker must consider 
130 Above n 122, I 6. 
131 Above n 122, 16. 
132Above n 122, 16, see also Appendix II. 
133 See Article 9 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 23, 24 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights . 
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them. This would mean that the international instruments containing these human 
rights and obligations of the family and the child are relevant considerations which 
decision makers must consider. If they do not then the courts may judicially 
review their decisions on the bases of illegality. 
Following on from the establishment of a relevant consideration the courts may 
then question whether any reasonable Minister could have made that decision 
This would be an example of the courts judicially reviewing a case on the ground 
of irrationality. Tavita by proposing that international human rights and 
obligations may be relevant considerations in family reunification cases opens the 
door for the contention that a Minister's decision may be unreasonable based on 
the an error of law. The ground of irrationality is uncertain and may be extended 
in New Zealand to include a review of substantive fairness. If this were the case 
the courts could judicially review an immigration case on the grounds that the 
:Minister could not have reasonably come to that decision based on the facts. The 
practical effects of this would be that the courts would be augmenting 
Governmental policy. 
The above comments on how T avita may lead into cases of judicial review based 
on the ground of irrationality is conjecture, but it is possible that Tavita could 
open the flood gates of judicial review of family reunification immigration cases 
VIl1 CONCLUSION 
The impact immigration issues has on the family are severe and often final. New 
Zealand's Governmental policy concerning the family is out of date and biased. 
The present residence policy does not reflect the changing attitudes of New 
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Zealand society or the change in domestic jurisprudence. The Immigration 
Service when it reviews this policy should recommend to the Government that 
policy adhere to contemporary thinking and domestic legislation, such as the Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. 
Areas of developing law, such as judicial review and international law, have an 
enormous effect on immigration concerns. The principle of international law 
which was commonly advanced was the rule that States are free to control at will 
the entry and residence of aliens. The rule has been diluted with recent 
developments in the area. This emphasis on a State's freedom is now misplaced in 
contemporary international relations. The proliferation of treaties concerned with 
human rights parallels with the necessity of States to uphold their international 
obligations within their boundaries. 
Several multinational legal instruments governing the protection of human rights 
place emphasis on the sanctity and unity of the family. Many international 
instruments now enable individuals complaints to be heard. Therefore individual 
human rights transgressions within States can now result in global embarrassment. 
It is amazing to think that a nations immigration policy could now be reviewed by 
an international court or committee. 
New Zealand should give practical effect to the treaties it ratifies. International 
obligations should be incorporated into immigration legislation and policy. 
Otherwise New Zealand could be seen to merely giving lip service to the human 
rights contained within international instruments. 
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The potential extension of judicial review in family reunification cases is not the 
correct extension of immigration practices. The prospect of substantive review of 
these cases draws a very fine line in the doctrine of separation of powers. 
Government should consider the pressure from the courts in this area as an 
indication that the area is in need of reform. If the Government's policy observed 
human rights obligations set out in both domestic and international law the courts 
avenue to encroach on this area of foreign affairs would be substantially lessoned. 
The courts have always been reluctant to interfere with immigration issues and it is 
submitted they are still reluctant. But in the present system of manifestly unfair 
Governmental family reunification policy it has been left up to the courts to rectify 
the unfairness. 
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CHAPTER 7 RESIDENTS 
Assessing a parent application 
Family centre 
of gravity in 
New Zealand 
Examples 
No of Children 
2 
5 
4 
6 
6 
2 
4 
4 
4 
6 
I 
l/lf)2 
Parents meet the "centre of gravity" principle where 
if they have no dependent children 
• they have an equal or greater number of adult children lawfully pennanently 
resident in New Zealand than in any other single country including their home 
country 
if they have dependent children 
• they have an equal or greater number of adult children lawfully permanently 
resident in New Zealand than in any other single country including their home 
country, and 
• the number of their dependent children is the same as or less than the number of 
adult children resident in New Zealand. 
The tables below give examples of how the "centre of gravity " principle is 
applied. 
PARENTS WITH NO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 
In New Zealand In Home Country Third Country Eligible? 
1 1 - YES 
2 1 2 YES 
1 1 2 NO 
2 1 3 NO 
2 2 2 YES 
PARENTS WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN 
1 adult 1 depdt - YES 
1 adult 1 adult - NO 
2 depdt 
1 adult 2 depdt 1 adult NO 
1 adult . 1 adult 1 adult YES 
1 depdt 
2 adult 2 depdt 2 adult YES 
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Overstayer's 
c-,-.,·,-. . • .. ~ ,... 
'/ case 'far 
'j ' ·reii~ing' 
NZPA Wellington 
· The Court of Appeal says uni-
; versa! rights and New Zealand's 
international obligations are 
part of an irrunigration case 
which involves the child of a 
· Western SamoaI1.~vcrstayP._r. ... 
It was a case wh(~1t'·might ·h"ave Ji!.!;: 
reaching implications, the court pres1-
dcr.t. Sir Robin Cooke. said in an interim 
Judgment. 
The court adjourned the case so the 
:ippellant. Mr Viliamu Tavita. could apply 
to tile Minister of Immigration to stay in 
New Zealand. 
Mr Tavita armed in New Zealand from 
Western Samoa in 1987 on a visitor's 
permit. 
, His application for a residence permll 
was declined and in 1990 the Lower Hutt 
District Court granted the Immigration 
Service·s request for a removal warrant. 
Mr Tavita·s appeal to the Minister of 
Immigration was declined. 
On June 29. 1991. Natia Tavita was born 
·in New Zealand. Mr Tavita married the 
mother the following month. 
While the mother worked the father 
looked after the child during the day. He 
also did some panelbeating at home. 
, Sir Robin noted neither parent received 
4 Socinl Welfare bene[iL 
In October 1993. Mr Tavita swore an 
affidavit that he would lose· contact with 
his daughter and wife if he were forced to 
leare New Zealand. He had no property 
or job to go to in Samoa and he would be 
unable to support them. 
Sir Robin said that in September 1993, 
Mr Tavita was taken to the airport but his 
removal was stopped by a stay in proceed-
ing;. After a judicial review of the case in 
the High Court, the stay on the removal 
order remained pending tile present 
appeal. . 
Sfr Robin said: "It may be tnouglit ~!":;:~ 
the appropriate minister would welcome 
the opportunity of reviewing the case in 
the light of an Ul}-t<>-<late investigation and 
assessment. 
"Nothing of the sort appears to have 
occurred v.·ithin the [Immigration) depart-
ment. Still less has the case been reconsid-
ered. in the light of current 
circumstances. at ministerial level." 
While understandable. the case should 
be reconsidered. 
The child. whatever the merits or de-
merits or either of her parents. was not 
responsible for them. Her future as a New 
Zealand citizen was inevitably a responsi-
bility of New Zealand. he said. 
ln the appellant's case. reliance was 
placed on the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. giving a person 
subject to New Zealand jurisdiction a 
right to apply to the human rights commit-
tee of the United Nations. Reliance was 
also placed on the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
Sir Robin said criticism might result if 
there was :i f:i ilure to give practical effect 
to international instruments to which New 
Ze:iland was a party. 
. -, I I 
;case· may ·be . 
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remqval review 
The New Zeal.L ~J!mJ~i:n Service :f 
overhaul the way it expels ovcr~t.yers ta fflin-
1m1_se the_~otent;al tcaurna ta those people and ~ 
their families 
Immigration _Minister Roger Maxwell has 
ordered the service to review its practices. He ! 
wants to ensure overstayers are interviewed 
shortly before they are placed in custody and 
then made to leave. 
He cited . the case where a woman who was 
breast feeding was arrested three years after 
a removal order had originally been served on 
~er. Mr Maxwell said she had been released 
J~to t~e care of a responsible person once Jier 
s1_tua~10n was recognised but the situation 
h1g,?lighted the need for better practices. 
The perso11al circumstances of overstayers 
can change," he said. "Where the care of chil-
dren becomes an issue during removal proced-
ures an alternative to custody will be 
arranged." 
Mr Maxwell said the ·execution of a remov-
al. o_rd~r. should be undertaken with a view to 
m1mm1smg potential trauma on the overstaver 
1>_, their fam1l,Y. Where identity was ques-
tio~ed, removal procedures would be delayed 
untll the matter was resolved. 
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Cas.e mafOpen 
door for illegal 
immigrantrt~r~ 
THE Labour Department Immi-
gration Service is grappling with a 
complex legal issue that may en-
able people living illegally in New 
Zealand to avoid deportation if 
their children are born here. 
The department has to decide 
whether to recommend that Immigra-
tion Minister Roger Maxwell allow 
Western Samoan overstayer Viliamu 
Tavita to stay in New Zealand. 
If it does, and the Government 
agrees, the door may be opened to 
thousands of would-be immigrants to 
skip normal channels•by simply com-
ing here and having children. 
It it does not, it could be argued 
New Zealan·d is breaching inter-
national covenants on civil and polit-
ical rights and rights of children. 
Mr Tavita's case is being cited as a 
reference point for the case of Nelson 
Bays rugby representative Tom Mata-
kaiongo, of Tonga, who also faces be-
ing sent home but has a New Zea-
land-born child. 
A spo~esman for Mr Maxwell said. 
this week the Matakaiongo investiga-
tion was being considered by the ser-
vice's legal staff after Mr Matakai-
ongo's lawyer, Graeme Malone, wrote 
"requesting basically that he be al-
lowed to stay in New Zealand". 
Mr Tavita arrived in New Zealand 
on a visitor's permit in 1987 and was 
declined residence. In 1990 Lower 
Hutt District Court granted the ser-
virP'~ r""""c:t f"r 'l r,-n,"' ' "1 ,1 •'\rr•Hit 
By JAMES GARDINER 
His . appeal to the immigration 
minister was declined but he had a 
child in June 1991 with a woman he 
married the following month. 
He was taken to the airport for 
removal in September last year but 
the removal was stopped at the last 
Jllinute by a court order. , 
A judicial review in the High 
Court followed, then the case went to 
the Appeal Court, which adjourned it 
to allow an application to the min-
ister. 
Mr Tavita told the courts he 
would lose contact with his daughter 
and wife if he was forced to leave 
New Zealand and, with no job or 
property to go to in Samoa, he would 
be unable to support them. 
In an interim judgment in Decem-
ber, Appeal Court president Sir Rob-
in Cook said, "It may be thought the 
appropriate minister would welcome 
the opportunity of reviewing the case 
in the light of an up-to-date investiga-
tion and assessment." 
A child who was a New Zealand ·, 
citizen was inevitably New Zealand's 
responsibility, .whatever the merits of 
either parent, Sir Robin said. 
Matakaiongo, 24, pleaded not 
guilty to assault with a weapon in 
Nelson District Court on February 
· 15. He pleaded guilty to breach of 
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